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NEITHER RAIN, NOR SLEET... NOR THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS ... WILL PREVENT THE
U.S. POSTAL SERVICE FROM
DELIVERING HUSTLER
MAGAZINE
"[I]t is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although
not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions."' No truer
words could be spoken regarding one of the latest of Larry Flynt's court
battles,2 where it was established that the right to petition government
for a redress of grievances is nearly absolute and will not be restricted
merely because the petition takes the form of a magazine such as
Hustler.3
Under Title 39 of the United States Code, section 30084 ("the stat-
1. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941).
2. For an overview of some of Flynt's latest courtroom antics, see U.S. v. Flynt, 756 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1985). In that case, Flynt successfully appealed five judgments of criminal
contempt entered by the United States District Court for the Central District of California
because there was a substantial question as to his mental capacity to commit contempt. Id. at
1362, 1366. One of the contempt charges was issued by a U.S. magistrate when Flynt made a
series of obscene remarks at an indictment proceeding in which he was charged with flag
desecration and the unlawful wearing of a Purple Heart. Id. at 1355. The flag desecration
charge resulted when Flynt appeared in court on an earlier, unrelated contempt charge wear-
ing the American flag as a diaper. Id.
3. Hustler has been described as a "hard-core" men's magazine. See Faloona v. Hustler,
607 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (N.D. Tex. 1985). Hustler is offensive, controversial and just plain
raunchy. Id. The writing style is juvenile, the articles and fiction are at the level of a tabloid
newspaper and the photos of nudes are explicit, sleazy and sadistic. Id. at 1344 n.9.
4. 39 U.S.C. § 3008. The statute reads:
(a) Whoever for himself, or by his agents or assigns, mails or causes to be mailed
any pandering advertisement which offers for sale matter which the addressee in his
sole discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative shall be sub-
ject to an order of the Postal Service to refrain from further mailings of such materi-
als to designated addressees thereof.
(b) Upon receipt of notice from an addressee that he has received such mail matter,
determined by the addressee in his sole discretion to be of the character described in
subsection (a) of this section, the Postal Service shall issue an order, if requested by
the addressee, to the sender thereof, directing the sender and his agents or assigns to
refrain from further mailings to the named addressees.
(c) The order of the Postal Service shall expressly prohibit the sender and his agents
or assigns from making any further mailings to the designated addressees, effective
on the thirtieth calendar day after receipt of the order. The order shall also direct the
sender and his agents or assigns to delete immediately the names of the designated
addressees from all mailing lists owned or controlled by the sender or his agents or
assigns and, further, shall prohibit the sender and his agents or assigns from the sale,
rental, exchange, or other transaction involving mailing lists bearing the names of the
designated addressees.
39 U.S.C. § 3008(a)-(c) (1971).
L O YOLA ENTER TAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
ute"), an addressee who receives any pandering advertisement5 may re-
quest the Postal Service to issue a prohibitory order to the sender. In
United States Postal Service v. Hustler Magazine ("Hustler"),6 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia held the statute uncon-
stitutional as applied to addressees who are Members of Congress be-
cause such an application would violate the sender's First Amendment
right to petition the government.
7
In September 1983, Larry Flynt, publisher and editor of Hustler
magazine ("the magazine"), mailed a current issue of the magazine to
each member of Congress. Each magazine contained subscription adver-
tisements. 8 Flynt enclosed a letter with each mailing in which he de-
scribed the contents of the magazine as the latest news, sex reviews,
pornography and in-depth investigative articles. He further stated that
he would continue to send monthly issues of the magazine so that the
Members would be well informed on social issues and trends.9
As of October 29, 1984, approximately 264 congressional members
had complained about these mailings to the Postal Service. In response,
the Postal Service issued approximately 264 prohibitory orders addressed
to Larry Flynt and Hustler Magazine, Inc. ("Hustler Magazine"). Hus-
tler Magazine continued to send copies of its publication to the Members
after having received the prohibitory orders. Flynt again wrote the
Members to explain that he would continue to send them the magazine
"because I'm exercising my first amendment right to express my political
and social views to public officials."'
In February 1985, the Postal Service brought an action against Hus-
tler Magazine and Larry Flynt, " requesting a declaration that defend-
ants had violated the prohibitory orders and seeking an injunction
enforcing the orders. The district court determined that the case turned
on whether the word "addressee," as used in the statute, may constitu-
tionally include congressional members.' 2 It held that the word "ad-
dressee" referred to private citizens, and hence, as applied to members of
Congress, the statute was unconstitutional.' 3 The court also concluded
5. Pandering is defined as the marketing or purveying of materials by emphasizing their
sexually provocative nature. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
6. 630 F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1986).
7. Id. at 873.
8. See supra notes 4 and 5.
9. Hustler, 630 F. Supp. at 868.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 869. Other named defendants were LFP, Inc. and Larry Flynt Publications. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 869, 875.
[Vol. 8
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
that congressional members have a reduced privacy interest because they
are elected officials, and that the right to petition the government is para-
mount to that interest.'
4
The district court began its analysis by discussing the Supreme
Court's holding in Rowan v. United States ("Rowan"). 5 There, the
Court found the statute constitutional on its face. 6 However, in Rowan
the addressees were householders; therefore, the district court distin-
guished it from Hustler where the addressees were members of Con-
gress. 7 In Rowan, the Supreme Court balanced the sender's right to
communicate with the addressee's right to be "left alone in the home."18
It confirmed the householder's right under the statute to exercise control
over unwanted mail."' Thus, it rejected the argument that the vendor
had a constitutional right to send unwanted mail into the home of
another.2°
In Hustler, the district court pointed out the Rowan Court's re-
peated interpretation of the word "addressee" as "householder."' 2' It
also emphasized that subsequent Supreme Court decisions confirmed the
Rowan Court's limited goal of protecting the privacy interests of
householders.22
The court found that the Rowan interpretation of "addressee" as
"householder" clearly conformed with the intent of Congress when it
enacted the statute. 23 The legislative history clarified that the statute was
enacted in response to complaints of private citizens who were faced with
14. Id. at 873.
15. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). The appellants were distributors, publishers, owners and opera-
tors of mail order businesses. They contended that the statute in question violated their consti-
tutional right to communicate. The Court stated that the statute was enacted in response to
public outcry regarding the receipt of mail deemed to be lewd and salacious in character. A
declared objective of Congress was to protect minors and the privacy of homes from such
material and to place the judgment of what constitutes an offensive invasion of those interests
in the hands of the addressee. Id. at 732. In rejecting appellants' argument, the Court con-
cluded that no one has the right to press even "good" ideas on an unwilling recipient in his
home. Id. at 739.
16. Id. at 737. At the time of the Rowan decision, the statute was codified as 39 U.S.C.
§ 4009 (1964).
17. Hustler, 630 F. Supp. at 869.
18. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736.
19. Id. at 737.
20. Id. at 738.
21. Hustler, 630 F. Supp. at 869.
22. Id. at 870. To support its point, the district court cited Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 n.l I (1980); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 209 n.4 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). Id.
23. Id.
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the problem of receiving unsolicited, sex-related material in the mail.
The court stated:
It is abundantly clear from the legislative history that Congress'
primary concern in approving legislation to limit offensive mail
matter was to protect families .... In its final version, the bill
struck the the proper balance between the individual's right to
privacy in his home or other place of abode and a sender's right
to communicate.24
The court in Hustler then balanced the Members' privacy interests
against Flynt's First Amendment right to petition Congress. It discussed
the unique role of congressional representatives, thereby distinguishing
them from private citizens. As elected representatives of the people,
Members of Congress should take care to be informed about concerns of
their constituents. Thus, the court noted, a representative cannot "be let
alone" without neglecting his or her duty as a representative.2" Further,
it found that Members of Congress do not enjoy the same measure of
privacy as do ordinary citizens.26 By assuming their offices, the Members
forfeit certain claims to privacy they might otherwise assert.27 In send-
ing the magazine to the Members' offices, Flynt did not threaten the pri-
vacy of their homes.28
When it analyzed the other side of the balance, the court found
Flynt's right to communicate with elected representatives to be stronger
than the right to communicate with private persons in their homes.
Flynt was exercising his First Amendment right to petition the govern-
ment. The court explained that the right to petition is one of the most
precious of the liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and it will be
fiercely upheld where there is no conflict with other legitimate interests.29
The court stated that there was no legitimate governmental interest in
restricting Flynt from sending the magazine to Members of Congress.
Rather, such a restriction would only serve to benefit the individual
members who held what the court termed an "understandable dislike"
for the magazine.30 Further, the Postal Service's prohibitory order was
based purely on the content of the communication, and would therefore
not meet the content-neutrality requirement by which the government
24. Id. at 870 n.4.
25. Id. at 871.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 872.
30. Id. at 873.
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must abide when restricting protected speech.3' Weighing Flynt's consti-
tutional right to petition Congress against the reduced privacy interest of
the representatives in their offices, the court held that the statute was not
a valid basis upon which to prohibit all further mailings of the magazine
to the Members.32 In rendering its decision in favor of Flynt and Hustler
Magazine, the court upheld the First Amendment right to petition Con-
gress for a redress of grievances.33
Historically, petitioning was a means of political participation for
disenfranchised groups.34 In colonial America, the right of citizens to
petition government was an affirmative, remedial right which required
governmental hearing and response. 35  Antebellum Congresses, 36 how-
ever, dedicated to the institution of slavery, were hostile to abolitionists'
grievances and refused to respect petitioners' right to legislative hear-
ing.37 Proponents of the "gag" rules3" successfully challenged the right
to hearing, seemingly collapsing the right to petition within the broader
right of freedom of expression.39
Today, the right to petition government does not include a corre-
sponding duty to listen to or respond to petitioners' grievances.' It
guarantees a presentative right: a right of access to government in order
to voice grievances and express opinions." "What a Senator does with
petitions is absolutely within his discretion and is not a proper subject of
judicial inquiry, even if it might appear that he be grossly abusing that
discretion." 42
Although it seems inconsistent that the court would devote so much
of its opinion to defending the right to petition while also affirming the
31. Id. The content-neutrality requirement prohibits the government from regulating pub-
lic expression on the basis of its message, content or point of view. See generally Police Dep't
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
32. Id.
33. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people ... to petition
the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
34. Hodgkiss, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569, 576
(1987).
35. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Griev-
ances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (1986).
36. WEBSTER's NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 76 (2d ed.
1979) defines antebellum as "before the war; specifically, before the American Civil War."
37. Higginson, supra note 35 at 143.
38. Id. at 158. The gag rules prevented Congress from receiving or in any way considering
petitions praying the abolition of slavery.
39. Id. at 143.
40. Minnesota State Bd. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984).
41. Higginson, supra note 35 at 165.
42. Id. at 143 n.2 (citing Chase v. Kennedy, No. 77-305-T, mem. op. at 2 (S.D. Cal. July
I1, 1977), aff'd, 605 F.2d 561, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 935 (1979)).
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Members' right to discard the magazines without even looking at them,43
it was correct in so doing."
The court clearly explained that Congress enacted the statute in or-
der to protect the privacy interests of private persons in their homes.45
That intent, coupled with the fact that the government attempted to
abridge the First Amendment right to petition government, should have
been sufficient alone to render a decision favorable to defendants. In-
stead, the court muddled its analysis by engaging in an unnecessary bal-
ancing act.
Ordinarily, government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message or content.4 6 Any government action aimed at communi-
cative impact is presumptively at odds with the First Amendment47 and
will be held unconstitutional unless the speech falls into a category un-
protected by the First Amendment.4"
If a government regulation is aimed at the non-communicative im-
pact of an act, it will be constitutional as long as it does not unduly
restrict the flow of information and ideas.49 It is usually only when a
regulation appears to be content-neutral that a court will resort to bal-
ancing.50 In such a case, the extent to which the communication is in
43. Hustler, 630 F. Supp. at 874. "Members are not forced to read the magazine or other
of the mail they receive in volume. We cannot imagine that Congressional offices all lack
wastebaskets." Id.
44. But see Hodgkiss, supra note 34 at 576. The author argues that the duty to respond is
essential to make petitioning a meaningful right. If the government has no duty to consider or
respond to petitions, the right contributes little to democratic decisionmaking and would guar-
antee no more than the freedom of speech. "Defining the right to petition as merely a right to
come forward is similar to saying that citizens can vote but candidates with the most votes will
not necessarily take office, or that plaintiffs can file lawsuits but defendants have no duty to
answer."
45. Hustler, 630 F. Supp. at 870. The legislative history confirms that Congress intended
to protect the privacy of persons in their homes. See H.R. Rep. No. 722, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
68 (1967).
46. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
47. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 581 (1978).
48. Id. at 582. There are several categories of speech which the Supreme Court has de-
clared unprotected by the First Amendment. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974) (defamation of private persons). See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech
that is both directed to and likely to incite lawlessness). See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation of a public official regarding official conduct when made with
reckless disregard for the truth). See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity).
See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (fighting words that incite the person to whom
they are addressed to violence). In Hustler, the court noted that "[d]efendants in their mail-
ings are and continue to be subject to federal and state laws concerning obscenity. Presuma-
bly, defendants are well aware of this fact." 630 F. Supp. at 875 n.7.
49. TRIBE, supra note 47 at 582.
50. Id.
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fact inhibited is balanced against the interests served by enforcing the
regulation.5
The Rowan case is a good example of a case where balancing was
justified because at issue was the validity of a regulation enacted to pro-
tect the privacy of the home - a content-neutral regulation. The case
could have been analyzed by explicitly balancing the degree of curtail-
ment upon the sender's First Amendment right to communicate against
the equally legitimate rights of addressees to privacy in their homes and
control over their property. 2 When a content-neutral regulation does
not involve a public forum, the government's burden of justification is
minimal.53 "[T]he Constitution tolerates (and may even compel) placing
the homeowner's right to exclude unwanted views above the speaker's
desire to intrude them."54
The Hustler case did not involve householders' privacy interests or
any other interest that might be legitimately balanced against Flynt's
First Amendment right to petition the government. Rather, the govern-
ment attempted to impede his communications with Congress solely be-
cause of the offensive nature of the magazine.55 The court specifically
said that the restriction was content-oriented.56 Upon that recognition, it
should have unequivocally held for the defendants.57 The first section of
the opinion established that the privacy rights guaranteed by the statute
do not apply to addressees who are Members of Congress.5" The court
conceded that there were no other legitimate interests to consider on the
government side of the balance.59 Nonetheless, it took the balancing
approach.
It has been proposed that whenever "core petitioning activity" is at
issue, there can never be a justification for time, place and manner re-
51. Id. at 683.
52. The Rowan court did not engage in an explicit balancing, yet it stated:
[Tihe right of every person to be let alone must be placed in the scales with the right
of others to communicate .... Weighing the highly important right to communi-
cate, but without trying to determine where it fits into constitutional imperatives,
against the very basic right to be free from sights, sounds, and tangible matter we do
not want, it seems to us that a mailer's right to communicate must stop at the
mailbox of an unreceptive addressee.
307 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970).
53. TRIBE, supra note 47 at 684.
54. Id. at 694.
55. Hustler, 630 F. Supp. at 873.
56. Id.
57. Albeit, the court did not discuss the content-based nature of the restriction until after
it had balanced the First Amendment rights of Flynt with the "limited privacy rights" of
members of Congress while servip, in their official roles.
58. Hustler, 630 F. Supp. at 871.
59. Id. at 873.
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strictions (content-neutral regulations) because no legitimate government
interests could be affected by the core petitioning activities themselves.60
"Core petitioning activity" is simply the preparing, signing and transmis-
sion of a written petition to government. 61 Any protection of activities
beyond core petitioning is derived from constitutional rights other than
the right to petition.6" On the facts, Flynt was involved only with core
petitioning activity when he sent the magazines to Congress. 63 Accord-
ingly, the court should have upheld the right categorically instead of
balancing.
Where the grievance is against government and private inter-
ests are not subject to injury, the right should be preserved in
nearly absolute form. Any offense a member of government
might take on account of petitions containing obscenity or sex-
ually oriented speech, inaccurate statements on commercial
matters or criticisms and political statements by subordinates
obviously cannot be of sufficient gravity to justify an encroach-
ment on the right. 6'
The court reached the same result by balancing as it would have
reached had it categorically ruled against the application of the statute.
However, the use of the balancing approach in a case such as Hustler is
questionable. In the words of Professor Laurence Tribe:
If the judicial branch is to protect dissenters from a majority's
tyranny, it cannot be satisfied with a process of review that re-
quires a court to assess after each incident a myriad of facts, to
guess at the risks created by the expressive conduct, and to as-
sign a specific value to the hard-to-measure worth of particular
instances of free expression. The results of any such process of
review will be some "famous victories" for the cause of free
expression but will leave no one very sure that any particular
expression will find a constitutional shield .... The balancing
approach is ... a slippery slope; once an issue is seen as a mat-
60. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging..."An Analysis of the Neglected But Nearly
Absolute Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV., 1153, 1191 (1981).
61. Id.
62. Id. For instance, if petitioning occurs at a demonstration, the demonstration will not
necessarily be given absolute protection under the right to petition because it goes beyond the
scope of core petitioning activity. Instead, the demonstration is protected by other First
Amendment rights such as freedom of expression, assembly and association. As such, the
demonstration may be regulated via reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.
63. In any event, the government never contended that Flynt was not engaged in petition-
ing activity.
64. Smith, supra note 60 at 1193.
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ter of degree, first amendment protections become especially re-
liant on the sympathetic administration of the law.... [W]hen
the government's concern is with message content, it has
proven both possible and necessary to proceed categorically.65
It may be unsettling to consider that the right to petition the gov-
ernment guarantees nothing more than the right to freedom of expres-
sion: a right to speak, but not a right to be listened to. But this is a
logical and efficient interpretation of the right, despite the fact that it is
not what the Framers of the Constitution intended. Given the tremen-
dous growth of the country and corresponding expansion of governmen-
tal functions over the last two hundred years, it would be an onerous
burden on government officials should they be required to consider and
respond to every petition. Moreover, the right of every adult citizen to
vote ensures responsiveness from elected officials; therefore, it is unlikely
that petitions with majority support will fall into the Congressional
wastebaskets along with the latest issue of Hustler magazine.
Marie McTeague
65. TRIBE, supra note 47 at 583-84.
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